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The classical de Finetti theorem provides an operational definition of
the concept of an unknown probability in Bayesian probability theory, where
probabilities are taken to be degrees of belief instead of objective states of
nature. In this paper, we motivate and review two results that generalize
de Finetti’s theorem to the quantum mechanical setting: Namely a de Finetti
theorem for quantum states and a de Finetti theorem for quantum operations.
The quantum-state theorem, in a closely analogous fashion to the original de
Finetti theorem, deals with exchangeable density-operator assignments and
provides an operational definition of the concept of an “unknown quantum
state” in quantum-state tomography. Similarly, the quantum-operation the-
orem gives an operational definition of an “unknown quantum operation” in
quantum-process tomography. These results are especially important for a
Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics, where quantum states and (at
least some) quantum operations are taken to be states of belief rather than
states of nature.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a quantum state? 1 Since the earliest days of quantum theory, it has been
understood that the quantum state can be used (through the Born rule) to derive probability
distributions for the outcomes of all measurements that can be performed on a quantum
system. But is it more than that? Is a quantum state an actual property of the system it
describes? The Bayesian view of quantum states [1–6,13–22] is that it is not: The quantum
state is not something the system itself possesses. Rather it is solely a function of the
observer (or, better, agent) who contemplates the predictions, gambles, decisions, or actions
he might make with regard to those quantum measurements.
1This paper represents predominantly a culling of the material in Refs. [1–3]. Everything, however,
has been updated to accommodate the major shift in our thinking represented in Refs. [4–6]. In
particular, it reflects a change in our views of quantum probabilities from that of an objective
Bayesianism of the type promoted by E. T. Jaynes [7] to a subjective or personalistic Bayesianism
of the type promoted by B. de Finetti, L. J. Savage, J. M. Bernardo and A. F. M. Smith, and
R. Jeffrey [8–12]. This makes all the difference in the world with regard to the meaning of quantum
states, operations, and their usage within statistical theory.
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What distinguishes this view from a more traditional “Copenhagen-interpretation style”
view—for instance the view expressed so clearly and carefully in Ref. [23]—is that there is
no pretense that a quantum state represents a physical fact. Quantum states come logically
before that: They represent the temporary and provisional beliefs a physicist holds as he
travels down the road of inquiry. It is the outcomes of quantum measurements that represent
physical facts within quantum theory, not the quantum states. In particular, there is no fact
of nature to prohibit two different agents from using distinct pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 for a
single quantum system. 2 Difficult though this may be to accept for someone trained in the
traditional presentation of quantum mechanics, the only thing it demonstrates is a careful
distinction between the terms belief and fact.
Quantum states are not facts. 3 But if so, then what is an “unknown quantum state”?
There is hardly a paper in the field of quantum information that does not make use of
the phrase. Unknown quantum states are teleported [28,29], protected with quantum error
correcting codes [30,31], and used to check for quantum eavesdropping [32,33]. The list of
uses grows each day. Are all these papers nonsense? In a Bayesian view of quantum states,
the phrase is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms: If quantum states are states of belief
rather than states of nature, then a state is known by someone—at the very least, by the
agent who holds it.
Thus for a quantum Bayesian, if a phenomenon ostensibly invokes the concept of an
unknown state in its formulation, the unknown state must be a kind of shorthand for a more
involved story. In other words, the usage should be viewed a call to arms, an opportunity
for further analysis. For any phenomenon using the idea of an unknown quantum state, the
quantum Bayesian should demand that either:
1. The owner of the unknown state—some further agent—be explicitly identified. (In
this case, the unknown state is merely a stand-in for the unknown state of belief of an
essential player who went unrecognized in the original formulation.) Or,
2. If there is clearly no further agent upon the scene, then a way must be found to reex-
press the phenomenon with the term “unknown state” banished from the formulation.
(In this case, the end-product will be a single quantum state used for describing the
phenomenon—namely, the state that actually captures the initial agent’s overall beliefs
throughout.)
In this paper, we will analyze the particular use of unknown states that comes from
quantum-state tomography [34–36]. Beyond that, we will also argue for the necessity of (and
carry out) a similar analysis for quantum-process tomography [37–39].
2Contrast this to the treatment of Refs. [24–26]. In any case, the present point does not imply
that a single agent can believe willy-nilly anything he wishes. To quote D. M. Appleby, “You know,
it is really hard to believe something you don’t actually believe.”
3For a selection of papers that we believe help shore up this statement in various ways—though
most of them are not explicitly Bayesian in their view of probability—see Ref. [27].
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The usual, non-Bayesian description of quantum-state tomography is this. A device of
some sort repeatedly prepares many instances of a quantum system in a fixed quantum state
ρ, pure or mixed. An experimentalist who wishes to characterize the operation of the device
or to calibrate it for future use may be able to perform measurements on the systems it
prepares even if he cannot get at the device itself. This can be useful if the experimenter
has some prior knowledge of the device’s operation that can be translated into a probability
distribution over states. Then learning about the state will also be learning about the device.
Most importantly, though, this description of tomography assumes the state ρ is unknown.
The goal of the experimenter is to perform enough measurements, and enough kinds of
measurements (on a large enough sample), to estimate the identity of ρ.
ψ
? !
FIG. 1. What can the term “unknown state” mean if quantum states are taken to be solely
compendia of Bayesian expectations rather than states of nature? When we say that a system has
an unknown state, must we always imagine a further agent whose state of belief is symbolized by
some |ψ〉, and it is the identity of that belief which we are ignorant of?
This is clearly an example where there is no further player on whom to pin the unknown
state as a state of belief or judgment. Any attempt to find such a missing player would
be entirely artificial: Where would the player be placed? On the inside of the device the
tomographer is trying to characterize? The only available course is the second strategy
above—to banish the idea of the unknown state from the formulation of tomography.
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FIG. 2. To make sense of quantum tomography, must we resort to imagining a “man in the box”
who has a better description of the systems than we do? How contrived would the Bayesian story
be if this were so!
To do this, we take a cue from the field of Bayesian probability theory itself [8–11,40,41].
In Bayesian theory, probabilities are not objective states of nature, but measures of person-
alistic belief. The overarching Bayesian theme is to identify the conditions under which a
set of decision-making agents can come to a common belief or probability assignment for a
random variable even though their initial beliefs differ. Bernardo and Smith [11] make the
point forcefully:
[I]ndividual degrees of belief, expressed as probabilities, are inescapably the
starting point for descriptions of uncertainty. There can be no theories without
theoreticians; no learning without learners; in general, no science without scien-
tists. It follows that learning processes, whatever their particular concerns and
fashions at any given point in time, are necessarily reasoning processes which
take place in the minds of individuals. To be sure, the object of attention and
interest may well be an assumed external, objective reality: but the actuality
of the learning process consists in the evolution of individual, subjective beliefs
about that reality. However, it is important to emphasize . . . that the primitive
and fundamental notions of individual preference and belief will typically pro-
vide the starting point for interpersonal communication and reporting processes.
. . . [W]e shall therefore often be concerned to identify and examine features of
the individual learning process which relate to interpersonal issues, such as the
conditions under which an approximate consensus of beliefs might occur in a
population of individuals.
Following that theme is the key to understanding quantum tomography from a Bayesian
point of view.
The offending classical concept is an “unknown probability,” an oxymoron for the pre-
cisely same reason as an unknown quantum state. 4 The procedure analogous to quantum-
state tomography is the estimation of an unknown probability from the results of repeated
4If a quantum state is nothing more than a compendium of probabilities—Bayesian probabilities—
then, of course, it is for precisely the same reason.
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trials on “identically prepared systems,” all of which are said to be described by the same,
but unknown probability.
Let us first consider a trivial example to clinch the idea of subjective probabilities before
moving to a full tomographic setting. Suppose a die is thrown 10 times. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , 6}
represent the outcome of a single throw of the die, and suppose the results in the 10 throws
were these:
k = 1 appeared 1 times,
k = 2 appeared 4 times,
k = 3 appeared 2 times,
k = 4 appeared 2 times,
k = 5 appeared 1 times,
k = 6 appeared 0 times.
A typical inference problem is to assign a probability, p, to the outcome k = 6 in the next
throw of the die, given these data. But clearly the answer cannot be determined by the data
alone. It depends on a prior probability assignment. Possibilities include:
1. The assumption that the die is fair. In this case p is independent of the data and given
by p = 1/6.
2. A totally uninformative prior. In this case, a generalization of the Laplace rule of
succession [7] gives p = 1/16.
3. The die came from a box that contains only trick dice of two types: The first type
never comes up 1, and the other type never comes up 6. In this case, p = 0.
The point of this trivial example cannot be stressed enough. Data alone is never enough
to specify a probability distribution. The only way to “derive” a probability distribution
from data is to cheat—to make use of an implicit probability assignment made prior to the
collection of the data. This holds as much for a problem like the present one, whose setting
is a finite number of trials, as for a problem containing a potentially infinite number of trials.
The way to eliminate unknown probabilities from the discussion of infinite numbers of
trials was introduced by Bruno de Finetti in the early 1930s [9,41]. The idea is to make
explicit the implicit class of priors generally used in such problems. He did this by focusing
on the meaning of the equivalence of repeated trials. What could equivalent trials mean—de
Finetti asked—but that a probability assignment for multiple trials should be symmetric
under the permutation of those trials? With his classical representation theorem, de Finetti
[9] showed that a multi-trial probability assignment that is permutation-symmetric for an
arbitrarily large number of trials—he called such multi-trial probabilities exchangeable—is
equivalent to a probability for the “unknown probabilities.” Thus the unsatisfactory concept
of an unknown probability vanishes from the description in favor of the fundamental idea of
assigning an exchangeable probability distribution to multiple trials.
This cue in hand, it is easy to see how to reword the description of quantum-state
tomography to meet our goals. What is relevant is simply a judgment on the part of the
experimenter—notice the essential subjective character of this “judgment”—that there is no
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distinction between the systems the device is preparing. In operational terms, this is the
judgment that all the systems are and will be the same as far as observational predictions are
concerned. At first glance this statement might seem to be contentless, but the important
point is this: To make this statement, one need never use the notion of an unknown state—
a completely operational description is good enough. Putting it into technical terms, the
statement is that if the experimenter judges a collection of N of the device’s outputs to have
an overall quantum state ρ(N), he will also judge any permutation of those outputs to have
the same quantum state ρ(N). Moreover, he will do this no matter how large the number N
is. This, complemented only by the consistency condition that for any N the state ρ(N) be
derivable from ρ(N+1), makes for the complete story.
The words “quantum state” appear in this formulation, just as in the original formulation
of tomography, but there is no longer any mention of unknown quantum states. The state
ρ(N) is known by the experimenter (if no one else), for it represents his state of belief. More
importantly, the experimenter is in a position to make an unambiguous statement about
the structure of the whole sequence of states ρ(N): Each of the states ρ(N) has a kind of
permutation invariance over its factors. The content of the quantum de Finetti representation
theorem [42,43]—which we will demonstrate in a later section—is that a sequence of states
ρ(N) can have these properties, which are said to make it an exchangeable sequence, if and
only if each term in it can also be written in the form
ρ(N) =
∫
P (ρ) ρ⊗N dρ , (1.1)
where ρ⊗N = ρ ⊗ ρ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ is an N -fold tensor product and P (ρ) is a fixed probability
distribution over density operators. 5
The interpretive import of this theorem is paramount. It alone gives a mandate to the
term unknown state in the usual description of tomography. It says that the experimenter
can act as if his state of belief ρ(N) comes about because he knows there is a “man in the
box,” hidden from view, repeatedly preparing the same state ρ. He does not know which
such state, and the best he can say about the unknown state is captured in the probability
distribution P (ρ).
The quantum de Finetti theorem furthermore makes a connection to the overarching
theme of Bayesianism stressed above. It guarantees for two independent observers—as long
as they have a rather minimal agreement in their initial beliefs—that the outcomes of a suf-
ficiently informative set of measurements will force a convergence in their state assignments
for the remaining systems [2]. This “minimal” agreement is characterized by a judgment on
the part of both parties that the sequence of systems is exchangeable, as described above,
and a promise that the observers are not absolutely inflexible in their opinions. Quantita-
tively, the latter means that though P (ρ) might be arbitrarily close to zero, it can never
vanish.
This coming to agreement works because an exchangeable density operator sequence can
be updated to reflect information gathered from measurements by a quantum version of
5For further technical elaborations on the quantum de Finetti theorem, see Ref. [44].
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Bayes’s rule for updating probabilities. Specifically, suppose the starting point of a quantum
tomography experiment is a prior state
ρ(N+M) =
∫
P (ρ) ρ⊗(N+M)dρ (1.2)
forN+M copies of the system. Then the firstN systems are measured. Say the measurement
outcomes are represented by a vector α = (α1, . . . , αN). It can be shown that the post-
measurement state of the remaining M copies conditioned on the outcome α is of the form
ρ(M) =
∫
P (ρ|α) ρ⊗Mdρ , (1.3)
where P (ρ|α) is given by a quantum Bayes rule [2]. In the special case that the same
measurement, {Eα}, is measured on all N copies, the quantum Bayes rule takes the simple
form
P (ρ|α) = P (ρ)P (α|ρ)
P (α)
, (1.4)
where
P (α|ρ) = tr( ρ⊗N Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗EαN ) (1.5)
and
P (α) =
∫
P (ρ)P (α|ρ) dρ . (1.6)
For a sufficiently informative set of measurements, as N becomes large, the updated proba-
bility P (ρ|α) becomes highly peaked on a particular state ρα dictated by the measurement
results, regardless of the prior probability P (ρ), as long as P (ρ) is nonzero in a neighborhood
of ρα. Suppose the two observers have different initial beliefs, encapsulated in different priors
Pi(ρ), i = 1, 2. The measurement results force them with high probability to a common state
of belief in which any number M of additional systems are assigned the product state ρ⊗Mα ,
i.e., ∫
Pi(ρ|α) ρ⊗M dρ −→ ρ⊗Mα (1.7)
for N sufficiently large.
This shifts the perspective on the purpose of quantum-state tomography: It is not about
uncovering some “unknown state of nature,” but rather about the various observers’ coming
to agreement over future probabilistic predictions. 6 In this connection, it is interesting to
note that the quantum de Finetti theorem and the conclusions just drawn from it work only
within the framework of complex vector-space quantum mechanics. For quantum mechanics
6For an emphasis of this point in the setting of quantum cryptography, see Ref. [45].
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based on real and quaternionic Hilbert spaces, the connection between exchangeable density
operators and unknown quantum states does not hold [1].
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II, we discuss the classical
de Finetti representation theorem [9,46] in the context of Bayesian probability theory. In
Sec. III, we introduce the Bayesian formulation of tomography in terms of exchangeable
multi-system density operators, accompanied by a critical discussion of objectivist formu-
lations of tomography. Furthermore, we state the quantum-state de Finetti representation
theorem. Section IV presents an elementary proof of the quantum de Finetti theorem. There,
also, we introduce a novel measurement technique for tomography based upon generalized
quantum measurements. In Sec. V, we come to an intermezzo, mentioning possible exten-
sions of the main theorem. In Sec. VI, we change course to consider the issue of quantum
operations. In particular, we argue that (at least some) quantum operations should be con-
sidered subjective states of belief, just as quantum states themselves. This brings to the
fore the issue of “unknown quantum operations” within a Bayesian formulation of quantum
mechanics. In Sec. VII, we pose the need for a version of a quantum de Finetti theorem for
quantum operations in order to make sense of quantum-process tomography from a Bayesian
point of view. In Sec. VIII, we make the statement of the theorem precise. And in Sec. IX,
we run through the proof of this quantum-process de Finetti theorem. Finally in Sec. X, we
conclude with a discussion of where this research program is going. In particular, we defend
ourselves against the (glib) “shot gun” reaction that all of this amounts to a rejection of
realism altogether: It simply does not.
II. THE CLASSICAL DE FINETTI THEOREM
The tension between the objectivist and Bayesian points of view is not new with quantum
mechanics. It arises already in classical probability theory in the form of the war between
“objective” and “subjective” interpretations [47]. According to the subjective or Bayesian
interpretation, probabilities are measures of personal belief, reflecting how an agent would
behave or bet in a certain situation. On the other hand, the objective interpretations—in
all their varied forms, from frequency interpretations to propensity interpretations—attempt
to view probabilities as real states of affairs or “states of nature” that have nothing to do
with an agent at all. Following our discussion in Sec. I, it will come as no surprise to the
reader that the authors wholeheartedly adopt the Bayesian approach. For us, the reason
is simply our experience with this question, part of which is an appreciation that objective
interpretations inevitably run into insurmountable difficulties. (See Refs. [8,10,11,40] for a
sampling of criticisms of the objectivist approach.)
We will note briefly, however, that the game of roulette provides an illuminating example.
In the European version of the game, the possible outcomes are the numbers 0, 1, . . . , 36.
For a player without any privileged information, all 37 outcomes have the same probability
p = 1/37. But suppose that shortly after the ball is launched by the croupier, another player
obtains information about the ball’s position and velocity relative to the wheel. Using the
8
information obtained, this other player can make more accurate predictions than the first. 7
His probability is peaked around some group of numbers. The probabilities are thus different
for two players with different states of belief.
Whose probability is the true probability? From the Bayesian viewpoint, this question
is meaningless: There is no such thing as a true probability. All probability assignments are
subjective assignments based specifically upon one’s prior data and beliefs.
For sufficiently precise data—including precise initial data on positions and velocities and
probably also including other details such as surface properties of the wheel—Newtonian me-
chanics assures us that the outcome can be predicted with certainty. This is an important
point: The determinism of classical physics provides a strong reason for adopting the subjec-
tivist view of probabilities [49]. If the conditions of a trial are exactly specified, the outcomes
are predictable with certainty, and all probabilities are 0 or 1. In a deterministic theory, all
probabilities strictly greater than 0 and less than 1 arise as a consequence of incomplete
information and depend upon their assigner’s state of belief.
Of course, we should keep in mind that our ultimate goal is to consider the status of
quantum states and, by way of them, quantum probabilities. One can ask, “Does this not
change the flavor of these considerations?” Quantum mechanics is avowedly not a theory of
one’s ignorance of a set of hidden variables [50]: 8 So how can its probabilities be subjective?
In Sec. III we argue that despite the intrinsic indeterminism of quantum mechanics, the
essence of the above discussion carries over to the quantum setting intact. Furthermore,
there are specifically quantum-motivated arguments for a Bayesian interpretation of quantum
probabilities.
For the present, though, let us consider in some detail the general problem of a repeated
experiment—spinning a roulette wheel N times is an example. As discussed briefly in Sec. I,
this allows us to make a conceptual connection to quantum-state tomography. Here the
individual trials are described by discrete random variables xn ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, n = 1, . . . , N ;
that is to say, there are N random variables, each of which can assume k discrete values. In
an objectivist theory, such an experiment has a standard formulation in which the proba-
bility in the multi-trial hypothesis space is given by an independent, identically distributed
distribution
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) = px1px2 · · · pxN = pn11 pn22 · · · pnkk , (2.1)
where nj is the number of times outcome j is listed in the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xN ), so that∑
j nj = N . The number pj (j = 1, . . . , k) describes the objective, “true” probability that
the result of a single experiment will be j (j = 1, . . . , k). This simple description—for the
objectivist—only describes the situation from a kind of “God’s eye” point of view. To the
experimentalist, the “true” probabilities p1, . . . , pk will very often be unknown at the outset.
7An entertaining account of a serious attempt to make money from this idea can be found in
Ref. [48].
8Perhaps, more carefully, we should have added, “without a stretch of the imagination.” For a
stretch of the imagination, see Ref. [51].
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Thus, his burden is to estimate the unknown probabilities by a statistical analysis of the
experiment’s outcomes.
In the Bayesian approach, it does not make sense to talk about estimating a true prob-
ability. Instead, a Bayesian assigns a prior probability distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) on the
multi-trial hypothesis space and then uses Bayes’s theorem to update the distribution in
the light of measurement results. A common criticism from the objectivist camp is that the
choice of distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) with which to start the process seems overly arbi-
trary to them. On what can it be grounded, they would ask? From the Bayesian viewpoint,
the subjectivity of the prior is a strength rather than a weakness, because assigning a prior
amounts to laying bare the necessarily subjective assumptions behind any probabilistic ar-
gument, be it Bayesian or objectivist. Choosing a prior among all possible distributions on
the multi-trial hypothesis space is, however, a daunting task. As we will now see, this task
becomes tractable by the de Finetti representation theorem.
It is very often the case that one or more features of a problem stand out so clearly
that there is no question about how to incorporate them into an initial assignment. In the
present case, the key feature is contained in the assumption that an arbitrary number of
repeated trials are equivalent. This means that one has no reason to believe there will be
a difference between one trial and the next. In this case, the prior distribution is judged
to have the sort of permutation symmetry discussed briefly in Sec. I, which de Finetti [41]
called exchangeability. The rigorous definition of exchangeability proceeds in two stages.
A probability distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) is said to be symmetric (or finitely exchange-
able) if it is invariant under permutations of its arguments, i.e., if
p(xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(N)) = p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) (2.2)
for any permutation π of the set {1, . . . , N}. The distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) is called
exchangeable (or infinitely exchangeable) if it is symmetric and if for any integer M > 0,
there is a symmetric distribution pN+M(x1, x2, . . . , xN+M) such that
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) =
∑
xN+1,...,xN+M
pN+M(x1, . . . , xN , xN+1, . . . , xN+M) . (2.3)
This last statement means that the distribution p can be extended to a symmetric distribu-
tion of arbitrarily many random variables. Expressed informally, an exchangeable distribu-
tion can be thought of as arising from an infinite sequence of random variables whose order
is irrelevant.
We now come to the main statement of this section: If a probability distribution
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) is exchangeable, then it can be written uniquely in the form
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) =
∫
Sk
P (p) px1px2 · · · pxN dp =
∫
Sk
P (p) pn11 p
n2
2 · · · pnkk dp , (2.4)
where p = (p1, p2, . . . , pk), and the integral is taken over the probability simplex
Sk =
p : pj ≥ 0 for all j and
k∑
j=1
pj = 1
 . (2.5)
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Furthermore, the function P (p) ≥ 0 is required to be a probability density function on the
simplex: ∫
Sk
P (p) dp = 1 . (2.6)
Equation (2.4) comprises the classical de Finetti representation theorem for discrete random
variables. (A simple proof of this theorem in the case of binary random variables can be
found in Refs. [46,1].)
Let us reiterate the importance of this result for the present considerations. It says
that an agent, making solely the judgment of exchangeability for a sequence of random
variables xj , can proceed as if his state of belief had instead come about through ignorance
of an unknown, but objectively existent set of probabilities p. His precise ignorance of p
is captured by the “probability on probabilities” P (p). This is in direct analogy to what
we desire of a solution to the problem of the unknown quantum state in quantum-state
tomography.
As a final note before finally addressing the quantum problem in Sec. III, we point out
that both conditions in the definition of exchangeability are crucial for the proof of the de
Finetti theorem. In particular, there are probability distributions p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) that are
symmetric, but not exchangeable. A simple example is the distribution p(x1, x2) of two
binary random variables x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1},
p(0, 0) = p(1, 1) = 0 , (2.7)
p(0, 1) = p(1, 0) =
1
2
. (2.8)
One can easily check that p(x1, x2) cannot be written as the marginal of a symmetric distri-
bution of three variables, as in Eq. (2.3). Therefore it can have no representation along the
lines of Eq. (2.4). (For an extended discussion of this, see Ref. [52].) Indeed, Eqs. (2.7) and
(2.8) characterize a perfect “anticorrelation” of the two variables, in contrast to the positive
correlation implied by distributions of de Finetti form.
III. THE QUANTUM DE FINETTI REPRESENTATION
Let us now return to the problem of quantum-state tomography described in Sec. I. In
the objectivist formulation of the problem, a device repeatedly prepares copies of a system
in the same quantum state ρ. This is generally a mixed-state density operator on a Hilbert
space Hd of d dimensions. We call the totality of such density operators Dd. The joint
quantum state of the N systems prepared by the device is then given by
ρ⊗N = ρ⊗ ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ , (3.1)
the N -fold tensor product of ρ with itself. This, of course, is a very restricted example
of a density operator on the tensor-product Hilbert space H⊗Nd ≡ Hd ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hd. The
experimenter, who performs quantum-state tomography, tries to determine ρ as precisely as
possible. Depending upon the version of the argument, ρ is interpreted as the “true” state
of each of the systems or as a description of the “true” preparation procedure.
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We have already articulated our dissatisfaction with this way of stating the problem, but
we give here a further sense of why both interpretations above are untenable. Let us deal
first with the version where ρ is regarded as the true, objective state of each of the systems.
In this discussion it is useful to consider separately the cases of mixed and pure states ρ.
The arguments against regarding mixed states as objective properties of a quantum system
are essentially the same as those against regarding probabilities as objective. In analogy to
the roulette example given in the previous section, we can say that, whenever an observer
assigns a mixed state to a physical system, one can think of another observer who assigns a
different state based on privileged information.
The quantum argument becomes yet more compelling if the apparently nonlocal nature of
quantum states is taken into consideration. Consider two parties, A and B, who are far apart
in space, say several light years apart. Each party possesses a spin-1/2 particle. Initially
the joint state of the two particles is the maximally entangled pure state 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉).
Consequently, A assigns the totally mixed state 1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|) to her own particle. Now
B makes a measurement on his particle, finds the result 0, and assigns to A’s particle the
pure state |0〉. Is this now the “true,” objective state of A’s particle? At what precise time
does the objective state of A’s particle change from totally mixed to pure? If the answer
is “simultaneously with B’s measurement,” then what frame of reference should be used to
determine simultaneity? These questions and potential paradoxes are avoided if states are
interpreted as states of belief. In our example, A and B have different states of belief and
therefore assign different states. For a detailed analysis of this example, see Ref. [53]; for an
experimental investigation see Ref. [54].
If one admits that mixed states cannot be objective properties, because another observer,
possessing privileged information, can know which pure state underlies the mixed state, then
it becomes very tempting to regard the pure states as giving the “true” state of a system.
Probabilities that come from pure states would then be regarded as objective, and the
probabilities for pure states within an ensemble decomposition of mixed states would be
regarded as subjective, expressing our ignorance of which pure state is the “true” state of
the system. An immediate and, in our view, irremediable problem with this idea is that
a mixed state has infinitely many ensemble decompositions into pure states [55–57], so the
distinction between subjective and objective becomes hopelessly blurred.
This problem can be made concrete by the example of a spin-1
2
particle. Any pure state
of the particle can be written in terms of the Pauli matrices as
|n〉〈n| = 1
2
(I + n · σ) = 1
2
(I + n1σ1 + n2σ2 + n3σ3) , (3.2)
where the unit vector n = n1e1 + n2e2 + n3e3 labels the pure state, and I denotes the unit
operator. An arbitrary state ρ, mixed or pure, of the particle can be expressed as
ρ =
1
2
(I + S · σ) , (3.3)
where 0 ≤ |S| ≤ 1. If |S| < 1, there is an infinite number of ways in which S can be written
in the form S =
∑
j pjnj , |nj | = 1, with the numbers pj comprising a probability distribution,
and hence an infinite number of ensemble decompositions of ρ:
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ρ =
∑
j
pj
1
2
(I + nj · σ) =
∑
j
pj |nj〉〈nj| . (3.4)
Suppose for specificity that the particle’s state is a mixed state with S = 1
2
e3. Writing
S = 3
4
e3 +
1
4
(−e3) gives the eigendecomposition,
ρ =
3
4
|e3〉〈e3|+ 1
4
|−e3〉〈−e3| , (3.5)
where we are to regard the probabilities 3/4 and 1/4 as subjective expressions of ignorance
about which eigenstate is the “true” state of the particle. Writing S = 1
2
n+ +
1
2
n−, where
n± = 12e3 ±
√
3
2
e1, gives another ensemble decomposition,
ρ =
1
2
|n+〉〈n+|+ 1
2
|n−〉〈n−| , (3.6)
where we are now to regard the two probabilities of 1/2 as expressing ignorance of whether
the “true” state is |n+〉 or |n−〉.
The problem becomes acute when we ask for the probability that a measurement of the z
component of spin yields spin up; this probability is given by 〈e3|ρ|e3〉 = 12(1+ 12〈e3|σ3|e3〉) =
3/4. The eigendecomposition gets this probability by the route
〈e3|ρ|e3〉 = 3
4
|〈e3|e3〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+
1
4
|〈e3|−e3〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
. (3.7)
Here the objective quantum probabilities, calculated from the eigenstates, report that the
particle definitely has spin up or definitely has spin down; the overall probability of 3/4
comes from mixing these objective probabilities with the subjective probabilities for the
eigenstates. The decomposition (3.6) gets the same overall probability by a different route,
〈e3|ρ|e3〉 = 1
2
|〈e3|n+〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
3/4
+
1
2
|〈e3|n−〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
3/4
. (3.8)
Now the quantum probabilities tell us that the objective probability for the particle to have
spin up is 3/4. This simple example illustrates the folly of trying to have two kinds of
probabilities in quantum mechanics. The lesson is that if a density operator is even partially
a reflection of one’s state of belief, the multiplicity of ensemble decomposition means that a
pure state must also be a state of belief.
Return now to the second version of the objectivist formulation of tomography, in which
the experimenter is said to be using quantum-state tomography to determine an unknown
preparation procedure. Imagine that the tomographic reconstruction results in the mixed
state ρ, rather than a pure state, as in fact all actual laboratory procedures do. Now there is a
serious problem, because a mixed state does not correspond to a well-defined procedure, but
is itself a probabilistic mixture of well-defined procedures, i.e., pure states. The experimenter
is thus trying to determine an unknown procedure that has no unique decomposition into
well defined procedures. Thus he cannot be said to be determining an unknown procedure at
13
all. This problem does not arise in a Bayesian interpretation, according to which all quantum
states, pure or mixed, are states of belief. In analogy to the classical case, the quantum de
Finetti representation provides an operational definition for the idea of an unknown quantum
state in this case.
Let us therefore turn to the Bayesian formulation of the quantum-state tomography
problem. Before the tomographic measurements, the Bayesian experimenter assigns a prior
quantum state to the joint system composed of the N systems, reflecting his prior state
of belief. Just as in the classical case, this is a daunting task unless the assumption of
exchangeability is justified.
The definition of the quantum version of exchangeability is closely analogous to the
classical definition. Again, the definition proceeds in two stages. First, a joint state ρ(N)
of N systems is said to be symmetric (or finitely exchangeable) if it is invariant under any
permutation of the systems. To see what this means formally, first write out ρ(N) with respect
to any orthonormal tensor-product basis onH⊗Nd , say |i1〉|i2〉 · · · |iN〉, where ik ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}
for all k . The joint state takes the form
ρ(N) =
∑
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
R
(N)
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
|i1〉 · · · |iN 〉〈j1| · · · 〈jN | , (3.9)
where R
(N)
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN is the density matrix in this representation. What we demand is that
for any permutation π of the set {1, . . . , N},
ρ(N) =
∑
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
R
(N)
ipi(1),...,ipi(N);jpi(1),...,jpi(N)
|i1〉 · · · |iN〉〈j1| · · · 〈jN | , (3.10)
which is equivalent to
R
(N)
ipi(1),...,ipi(N);jpi(1),...,jpi(N)
= R
(N)
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
. (3.11)
The state ρ(N) is said to be exchangeable (or infinitely exchangeable) if it is symmetric
and if, for any M > 0, there is a symmetric state ρ(N+M) of N +M systems such that the
marginal density operator for N systems is ρ(N), i.e.,
ρ(N) = trM ρ
(N+M) , (3.12)
where the trace is taken over the additionalM systems. In explicit basis-dependent notation,
this requirement is
ρ(N) =
∑
i1,...,iN ;j1,...,jN
 ∑
iN+1,...,iN+M
R
(N+M)
i1,...,iN ,iN+1,...,iN+M ;j1,...,jN ,iN+1,...,iN+M
|i1〉 · · · |iN〉〈j1| · · · 〈jN | .
(3.13)
In analogy to the classical case, an exchangeable density operator can be thought of infor-
mally as the description of a subsystem of an infinite sequence of systems whose order is
irrelevant.
The precise statement of the quantum de Finetti representation theorem [42,58] is that
any exchangeable state of N systems can be written uniquely in the form
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ρ(N) =
∫
Dd
P (ρ) ρ⊗N dρ . (3.14)
Here P (ρ) ≥ 0 is normalized by ∫
Dd
P (ρ) dρ = 1 , (3.15)
with dρ being a suitable measure on density operator space Dd [e.g., one could choose
dρ = dS dΩ in the parameterization (3.3) for a spin-1/2 particle]. The upshot of the theorem,
as already advertised, is that it makes it possible to think of an exchangeable quantum-state
assignment as if it were a probabilistic mixture characterized by a probability density P (ρ)
for the product states ρ⊗N .
Just as in the classical case, both components of the definition of exchangeability are
crucial for arriving at the representation theorem of Eq. (3.14). The reason now, however,
is much more interesting than it was previously. In the classical case, extendibility was used
solely to exclude anticorrelated probability distributions. Here extendibility is necessary to
exclude the possibility of Bell inequality violations for measurements on the separate systems.
This is because the assumption of symmetry alone for an N -party quantum system does not
exclude the possibility of quantum entanglement, and all states that can be written as a
mixture of product states—of which Eq. (3.14) is an example—have no entanglement [59].
A simple example for a state that is symmetric but not exchangeable is the Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger state of three spin-1
2
particles [60],
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉|1〉
)
, (3.16)
which is not extendible to a symmetric state on four systems. This follows because the only
states of four particles that marginalize to a three-particle pure state, like the GHZ state,
are product states of the form |GHZ〉〈GHZ| ⊗ ρ, where ρ is the state of the fourth particle;
such states clearly cannot be symmetric. These considerations show that in order for the
proposed theorem to be valid, it must be the case that as M increases in Eq. (3.12), the
possibilities for entanglement in the separate systems compensatingly decrease [61].
IV. PROOF OF THE QUANTUM DE FINETTI THEOREM
To prove the quantum version of the de Finetti theorem, we rely on the classical theo-
rem as much as possible. We start from an exchangeable density operator ρ(N) defined on
N copies of a system. We bring the classical theorem to our aid by imagining a sequence
of identical quantum measurements on the separate systems and considering the outcome
probabilities they would produce. Because ρ(N) is assumed exchangeable, such identical mea-
surements give rise to an exchangeable probability distribution for the outcomes. The trick
is to recover enough information from the statistics of these measurements to characterize
the exchangeable density operator.
With this in mind, the proof is expedited by making use of the theory of generalized
quantum measurements or positive operator-valued measures (POVMs) [62–64]. POVMs
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generalize the textbook notion of measurement by distilling the essential properties that
make the Born rule work. The generalized notion of measurement is this: Any set E = {Eα}
of positive-semidefinite operators on Hd that forms a resolution of the identity, i.e., that
satisfies
〈ψ|Eα|ψ〉 ≥ 0 , for all |ψ〉 ∈ Hd (4.1)
and ∑
α
Eα = I , (4.2)
corresponds to at least one laboratory procedure counting as a measurement. The outcomes
of the measurement are identified with the indices α, and the probabilities of those outcomes
are computed according to the generalized Born rule,
pα = tr(ρEα) . (4.3)
The set E is called a POVM, and the operators Eα are called POVM elements. Unlike
standard or von Neumann measurements, there is no limitation on the number of values α
can take, the operators Eα need not be rank-1, and there is no requirement that the Eα
be idempotent and mutually orthogonal. This definition has important content because the
older notion of measurement is simply too restrictive: there are laboratory procedures that
clearly should be called “measurements,” but that cannot be expressed in terms of the von
Neumann measurement process alone.
One might wonder whether the existence of POVMs contradicts everything taught about
standard measurements in the traditional graduate textbooks [65] and the well-known clas-
sics [66]. It does not. The reason is that any POVM can be represented formally as a standard
measurement on an ancillary system that has interacted in the past with the system of main
interest. Thus in a certain sense, von Neumann measurements capture everything that can
be said about quantum measurements [63]. A way to think about this is that by learning
something about the ancillary system through a standard measurement, one in turn learns
something about the system of real interest. Indirect though this might seem, it can be a
very powerful technique, sometimes revealing information that could not have been revealed
otherwise [67].
For instance, by considering POVMs, one can consider measurements with an outcome
cardinality that exceeds the dimensionality of the Hilbert space. What this means is that
whereas the statistics of a von Neumann measurement can only reveal information about the
d diagonal elements of a density operator ρ, through the probabilities tr(ρΠi), the statistics
of a POVM generally can reveal things about the off-diagonal elements, too. It is precisely
this property that we take advantage of in our proof of the quantum de Finetti theorem.
Our problem hinges on finding a special kind of POVM, one for which any set of outcome
probabilities specifies a unique operator. This boils down to a problem of pure linear algebra.
The space of operators on Hd is itself a linear vector space of dimension d 2. The quantity
tr(A†B) serves as an inner product on that space. If the POVM elements Eα span the
space of operators—there must be at least d 2 POVM elements in the set—the measurement
probabilities pα = tr(ρEα)—now thought of as projections in the directions Eα—are sufficient
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to specify a unique operator ρ. Two distinct density operators ρ and σ must give rise to
different measurement statistics. Such measurements, which might be called informationally
complete, have been studied for some time [68].
For our proof we need a slightly refined notion—that of a minimal informationally com-
plete measurement. If an informationally complete POVM has more than d 2 operators Eα,
these operators form an overcomplete set. This means that given a set of outcome proba-
bilities pα, there is generally no operator A that generates them according to pα = tr(AEα).
Our proof requires the existence of such an operator, so we need a POVM that has precisely
d 2 linearly independent POVM elements Eα. Such a POVM has the minimal number of
POVM elements to be informationally complete. Given a set of outcome probabilities pα,
there is a unique operator A such that pα = tr(AEα), even though, as we discuss below, A
is not guaranteed to be a density operator.
Do minimal informationally complete POVMs exist? The answer is yes. We give here a
simple way to produce one, though there are surely more elegant ways with greater symme-
try [69,70]. Start with a complete orthonormal basis |ej〉 on Hd, and let Γjk = |ej〉〈ek|. It is
easy to check that the following d 2 rank-1 projectors Πα form a linearly independent set.
1. For α = 1, . . . , d, let
Πα ≡ Γjj , (4.4)
where j, too, runs over the values 1, . . . , d.
2. For α = d+ 1, . . . , 1
2
d(d+ 1), let
Πα ≡ Γ(1)jk =
1
2
(
|ej〉+ |ek〉
)(
〈ej |+ 〈ek|
)
=
1
2
(Γjj + Γkk + Γjk + Γkj) , (4.5)
where j < k.
3. Finally, for α = 1
2
d(d+ 1) + 1, . . . , d 2, let
Πα ≡ Γ(2)jk =
1
2
(
|ej〉+ i|ek〉
)(
〈ej | − i〈ek|
)
=
1
2
(Γjj + Γkk − iΓjk + iΓkj) , (4.6)
where again j < k.
All that remains is to transform these (positive-semidefinite) linearly independent operators
Πα into a proper POVM. This can be done by considering the positive semidefinite operator
G defined by
G =
d2∑
α=1
Πα . (4.7)
It is straightforward to show that 〈ψ|G|ψ〉 > 0 for all |ψ〉 6= 0, thus establishing that G
is positive definite and hence invertible. Applying the (invertible) linear transformation
X → G−1/2XG−1/2 to Eq. (4.7), we find a valid decomposition of the identity,
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I =
d2∑
α=1
G−1/2ΠαG−1/2 . (4.8)
The operators
Eα = G
−1/2ΠαG
−1/2 (4.9)
satisfy the conditions of a POVM, Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2), and moreover, they retain the rank
and linear independence of the original Πα.
It is worthwhile noting a special property of all minimal informationally complete POVMs
{Eα}: For no quantum state ρ is it ever the case that trρEα = 1. Let us show this for the
case where all the Eα = kα|ψα〉〈ψα| are rank one. Suppose it were the case that for some
ρ, trρE0 = 1. Then it would also have to be the case that E0 = ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| for some
vector |ψ〉. But then, because ∑Eα = I, it follows that 〈ψα|ψ〉 = 0 for all α 6= 0. That
is, all the |ψα〉 must lie in a (d − 1)-dimensional subspace. But then it follows that at most
(d− 1)2 of the operators Eα, α 6= 0, can be linearly independent. Since (d− 1)2+1 6= d2, we
have a contradiction with the assumption that {Eα} is an informationally complete POVM.
(In particular, for the case of the particular, minimal informationally complete POVM in
Eq. (4.9), it can be shown that [6]
P (h) ≤
[
d− 1
2
(
1 + cot
3π
4d
)]−1
< 1 . (4.10)
For large d, this bound asymptotes to roughly (0.79d)−1.) What this means generically is
that for no informationally complete POVM can the vectors pα completely fill the probability
simplex.
FIG. 3. The planar surface represents the space of all probability distributions over d2 outcomes.
If the probability distributions are imagined to be generated by a minimal informationally complete
measurement, the set of valid quantum states in this representation represents a convex region
strictly smaller than the whole simplex.
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With this generalized measurement (or any other one like it), we can return to the main
line of proof. Recall we assumed that we captured our state of belief by an exchangeable
density operator ρ(N). Consequently, repeated application of the (imagined) measurement
E must give rise to an exchangeable probability distribution over the N random variables
αn ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d 2}, n = 1, . . . , N . We now analyze these probabilities.
Quantum mechanically, it is valid to think of the N repeated measurements of E as a
single measurement on the Hilbert space H⊗Nd ≡ Hd⊗· · ·⊗Hd. This measurement, which we
denote E⊗N , consists of d 2N POVM elements of the form Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EαN . The probability
of any particular outcome sequence of length N , namely α ≡ (α1, . . . , αN), is given by the
standard quantum rule,
p(N)(α) = tr[ ρ(N)(Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EαN )] . (4.11)
Because the distribution p(N)(α) is exchangeable, we have by the classical de Finetti theorem
[see Eq. (2.4)] that there exists a unique probability density P (p) on Sd2 such that
p(N)(α) =
∫
S
d2
P (p) pα1pα2 · · · pαN dp . (4.12)
It should now begin to be apparent why we chose to imagine a measurement E consisting
of precisely d 2 linearly independent elements. This allows us to assert the existence of a
unique operator Ap on Hd corresponding to each point p in the domain of the integral. The
ultimate goal here is to turn Eqs. (4.11) and (4.12) into a single operator equation.
With that in mind, let us define Ap as the unique operator satisfying the following d
2
linear equations:
tr(ApEα) = pα , α = 1, . . . , d
2 . (4.13)
Inserting this definition into Eq. (4.12) and manipulating it according to the algebraic rules
of tensor products—namely (A⊗B)(C ⊗D) = AC ⊗BD and tr(A⊗B) = (trA)(trB)—we
see that
p(N)(α) =
∫
S
d2
P (p) tr(ApEα1) · · · tr(ApEαN ) dp
=
∫
S
d2
P (p) tr(ApEα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ApEαN ) dp
=
∫
S
d2
P (p) tr[A⊗Np (Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗EαN )] dp . (4.14)
If we further use the linearity of the trace, we can write the same expression as
p(N)(α) = tr
[(∫
S
d2
P (p)A⊗np dp
)
Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ EαN
]
. (4.15)
The identity between Eqs. (4.11) and (4.15) must hold for all sequences α. It follows
that
ρ(N) =
∫
S
d2
P (p)A⊗Np dp . (4.16)
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This is because the operators Eα1 ⊗ · · · ⊗EαN form a complete basis for the vector space of
operators on H⊗Nd .
Equation (4.16) already looks very much like our sought after goal, but we are not there
quite yet. At this stage one has no right to assume that the Ap are density operators. Indeed
they generally are not: the integral (4.12) ranges over some points p in Sd 2 that cannot be
generated by applying the measurement E to any quantum state. Hence some of the Ap in
the integral representation cannot correspond to ‘unknown quantum states.’
The solution to this conundrum is provided by the overall requirement that ρ(N) be a valid
density operator. This requirement places a significantly more stringent constraint on the
distribution P (p) than was the case in the classical representation theorem. In particular, it
must be the case that P (p) vanishes whenever the corresponding Ap is not a proper density
operator. Let us move toward showing that.
We first need to delineate two properties of the operators Ap. One is that they are
Hermitian. The argument is simply
tr(EαA
†
p) = tr
[
(ApEα)
†] = [tr(ApEα)]∗ = tr(ApEα) , (4.17)
where the last step follows from Eq. (4.13). Because the Eα are a complete set of linearly
independent operators, it follows that A†p = Ap. The second property tells us something
about the eigenvalues of Ap:
1 =
∑
α
pα = tr
(
Ap
∑
α
Eα
)
= trAp . (4.18)
In other words the (real) eigenvalues of Ap must sum to unity.
We now show that these two facts go together to imply that if there are any non-quantum-
state Ap with positive weight P (p) in Eq. (4.16), then one can find a measurement for
which ρ(N) produces illegal “probabilities” for sufficiently large N . For instance, take a
particular Aq in Eq. (4.16) that has at least one negative eigenvalue −λ < 0. Let |ψ〉 be
a normalized eigenvector corresponding to that eigenvalue and consider the binary-valued
POVM consisting of the elements Π˜ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and Π = I − Π˜. Since tr(AqΠ˜) = −λ < 0, it
is true by Eq. (4.18) that tr(AqΠ) = 1 + λ > 1. Consider repeating this measurement over
and over. In particular, let us tabulate the probability of getting outcome Π for every single
trial to the exclusion of all other outcomes.
The gist of the contradiction is most easily seen by imagining that Eq. (4.16) is really a
discrete sum:
ρ(N) = P (q)A⊗Nq +
∑
p6=q
P (p)A⊗Np . (4.19)
The probability of N occurrences of the outcome Π is thus
tr(ρ(N)Π⊗N) = P (q) tr(A⊗Nq Π
⊗N ) +
∑
p6=q
P (p) tr(A⊗Np Π
⊗N)
= P (q) [tr(AqΠ)]
N +
∑
p6=q
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N
= P (q)(1 + λ)N +
∑
p6=q
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N . (4.20)
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There are no assurances in general that the right-hand term in Eq. (4.20) is positive, but if
N is an even number it must be. It follows that if P (q) ≥ 0, for sufficiently large even N ,
tr(ρ(N)Π⊗N ) > 1 , (4.21)
contradicting the assumption that it should always be a probability.
All we need to do now is transcribe the argument leading to Eq. (4.21) to the general
integral case of Eq. (4.16). Note that by Eq. (4.13), the quantity tr(ApΠ) is a (linear)
continuous function of the parameter p. Therefore, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such
that |tr(ApΠ)− tr(AqΠ)| ≤ ǫ whenever |p− q| ≤ δ, i.e., whenever p is contained within an
open ball Bδ(q) centered at q. Choose ǫ < λ, and define Bδ to be the intersection of Bδ(q)
with the probability simplex. For p ∈ Bδ, it follows that
tr(ApΠ) ≥ 1 + λ− ǫ > 1 . (4.22)
If we consider an N that is even, [tr(ApΠ)]
N is nonnegative in all of Sd2 , and we have that
the probability of the outcome Π⊗N satisfies
tr(ρ(N)Π⊗N) =
∫
S
d2
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp
=
∫
S
d2−Bδ
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp +
∫
Bδ
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp
≥
∫
Bδ
P (p) [tr(ApΠ)]
N dp
≥ (1 + λ− ǫ)N
∫
Bδ
P (p) dp . (4.23)
Unless ∫
Bδ
P (p) dp = 0 , (4.24)
the lower bound (4.23) for the probability of the outcome Π⊗N becomes arbitrarily large as
N → ∞. Thus we conclude that the requirement that ρ(N) be a proper density operator
constrains P (p) to vanish almost everywhere in Bδ and, consequently, to vanish almost
everywhere that Ap is not a physical state.
Using Eq. (4.13), we can trivially transform the integral representation (4.16) to one
directly over the convex set of density operators Dd and be left with the following statement.
Under the sole assumption that the density operator ρ(N) is exchangeable, there exists a
unique probability density P (ρ) such that
ρ(N) =
∫
Dd
P (ρ) ρ⊗N dρ . (4.25)
This concludes the proof of the quantum de Finetti representation theorem.
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V. INTERMEZZO
In classical probability theory, exchangeability characterizes those situations where the
only data relevant for updating a probability distribution are frequency data, i.e., the num-
bers nj in Eq. (2.4) which tell how often the result j occurred. The quantum de Finetti
representation shows that the same is true in quantum mechanics: Frequency data (with
respect to a sufficiently robust measurement) are sufficient for updating an exchangeable
state to the point where nothing more can be learned from sequential measurements; that
is, one obtains a convergence of the form (1.7), so that ultimately any further measurements
on the individual systems are statistically independent.
Beyond the aesthetic point of showing the consistency of the Bayesian conception of
quantum states, we also believe the technical methods exhibited here will be of interest in the
practical arena. Recently there has been a large literature on which classes of measurements
have various advantages for tomographic purposes [71,72]. To our knowledge, the work in
Ref. [1] reiterated here was the first to consider tomographic reconstruction based upon
minimal informationally complete POVMs. One can imagine several advantages to this
approach via the fact that such POVMs with rank-one elements are automatically extreme
points in the convex set of all measurements [73].
Furthermore, the classical de Finetti theorem is only the beginning with respect to gen-
eral questions in classical statistics to do with exchangeability and generalizations of the
concept [74]. One should expect no less of quantum exchangeability studies. In particular,
we are thinking of such issues as representation theorems for finitely exchangeable distribu-
tions [52,75]. Just as our method for proving the quantum de Finetti theorem was able to
rely heavily on the classical theorem, so one might expect similar benefits from the classical
results in the case of quantum finite exchangeability—although, there will certainly be new
aspects to the quantum case due to the possibility of entanglement in finite exchangeable
states [76]. Finally, a practical application of such representation theorems could be their
potential to contribute to the solution of some outstanding problems in constructing security
proofs for various quantum key distribution schemes [77,78].
VI. SUBJECTIVITY OF QUANTUM OPERATIONS
At this point we turn our attention to quantum operations. So far, we have made much
to-do of the subjectivity of quantum states. But what of quantum operations? Should this
structural element within quantum theory be considered of the nature of a fact—like the
outcome of a quantum measurement—or, like the quantum state, should it be recognized as
a statement of an agent’s belief or expectation [4]?
The usual presentation of the concept of a quantum operation is that it is the most
general quantum-state evolution allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics [63,79]. Upon
the process of measurement of some POVM {Eα}, depending upon the particular details of
a measurement interaction and the outcome α, an initial quantum state ρ can change to any
new state of the form
Φα(ρ) =
1
trρEα
∑
i
AαiρA
†
αi , (6.1)
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where Aαi can be any operators whatsoever, as long as they satisfy
Eα =
∑
i
A†αiAαi . (6.2)
In the case where the POVM is the completely uninformative one—i.e., the POVM {I}
comprised solely of the identity operator—one recovers the general expression for all possible
quantum mechanical time evolutions in terms of trace-preserving completely positive maps:
ρ −→ Φ(ρ) = 1
trρEα
∑
α
AαρA
†
α , (6.3)
where the Aα are any operators that satisfy
I =
∑
α
A†αAα . (6.4)
Let us first focus on the latter type of evolution. A quantum Bayesian should become
suspicious that it contains a subjective component because of another representation theorem
of Kraus [63]. For any trace preserving completely positive map Φ on a system, one can
always imagine an ancillary system A, a quantum state σ for that ancillary system, and
unitary interaction U between the system and the ancilla, such that
Φ(ρ) = trA
(
U(ρ⊗ σ)U †
)
, (6.5)
where trA represents a partial trace over the ancilla’s Hilbert space. The Bayesian should
ask, “Whose state of belief is σ?”
But worse than that, the representation in Eq. (6.5) is not unique. There can well be
distinct density operators τ for the ancilla and distinct unitary interactions V such that
Φ(ρ) = trA
(
V (ρ⊗ τ)V †
)
. (6.6)
What is to be made of this? If one accepts that a quantum state is a subjective judg-
ment, then it would seem one should also be compelled to accept that the map Φ can be
thought of as having (at least) a subjective component through the quantum state σ, and
that the subjective judgment even leaks into unitary operation U , nominally describing the
interaction.
Without belaboring that particular point, let us now change focus to the state-change
rule associated with the von Neumann collapse postulate. In that context, the measurement
operators Eα = |α〉〈α| correspond to projectors onto an orthonormal basis {|α〉} and
Φα(ρ) =
1
trρEα
EαρEα = |α〉〈α| . (6.7)
The salient point is that, conditioned on the measurement outcome, the final quantum state
for the system is uniquely determined after such a measurement.
Note what this implies. If the quantum operation associated with a measurement device
is an objective fact (i.e., of the same nature as the measurement outcome), then so too must
be the posterior quantum state Eα = |α〉〈α|. But the whole foundation of this paper is that
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quantum states are not objective facts. It follows that the quantum operation Φα cannot be
an objective fact either. Instead, the von Neumann collapse rule associated with a projective
measurement must be as much of a subjective judgment as a quantum state is in the first
place.
The moral: (At least some) quantum operations are not facts, and general quantum time
evolutions have a subjective component. 9 But, if so, then what are the “unknown quantum
operations” that experimentalists routinely measure in the laboratory?
VII. QUANTUM PROCESS TOMOGRAPHY
In quantum process tomography [37–39], an experimenter lets an incompletely specified
device act on a quantum system prepared in an input state of his choice, and then performs
a measurement (also of his choice) on the output system. This procedure is repeated many
times over, with possibly different input states and different measurements, in order to accu-
mulate enough statistics to assign a quantum operation to the device. Here and throughout
this section, by a quantum operation we mean a trace-preserving completely positive linear
map. Quantum process tomography has been demonstrated experimentally in liquid state
nuclear magnetic resonance [80,81], and recently a number of optical experiments [82,84,83]
have implemented entanglement-assisted quantum process tomography. The latter is a pro-
cedure that exploits the fact that quantum process tomography is equivalent to quantum
state tomography in a larger state space [85–88].
In the usual description of process tomography, it is assumed that the device performs
the same unknown quantum operation Φ every time it is used, and an experimenter’s prior
information about the device is expressed via a probability density p(Φ) over all possible
operations. What, however, is the operational meaning of an unknown quantum operation?
When does the action of a device leave off from an initial input so that the next input can
be sent through? In particular, what gives the right to suppose that a device does not have
memory or, for instance, does not entangle the successive inputs passing through it? These
questions boil down to the need to explore a single issue: What essential assumptions must
be made so that quantum process tomography is a logically coherent notion?
What is called for is a method of posing quantum process tomography that never requires
the invocation of the concept of an unknown quantum operation. This can be done by
focussing upon the action of a single known quantum operation Φ(N), which acts upon N
nominal inputs. In particular, we identify conditions under which Φ(N), (N = 1, 2, . . .), can
be represented as
Φ(N) =
∫
p(Φ)Φ⊗N dΦ , (7.1)
9Ref. [4], in fact, tries to argue for more: Namely, that all quantum operations are subjective states
of belief, just like all quantum states are subjective states of belief. The present work, however,
refrains from attempting that larger task.
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for some probability density p(Φ), and where the integration extends over all single-system
quantum operations Φ. With this theorem established, the conditions under which an ex-
perimenter can act as if his prior Φ(N) corresponds to ignorance of a “true” but unknown
quantum operation are made precise.
Our starting point is the closely aligned and similarly motivated de Finetti representation
theorem for quantum states of the previous sections. Here, we make use of the correspondence
between quantum process tomography and quantum-state tomography mentioned above to
derive a de Finetti representation theorem for sequences of quantum operations.
VIII. THE PROCESS-TOMOGRAPHY THEOREM
In this section and the next, we restrict our attention to devices for which the input
and output have the same Hilbert space dimension, D. In the following, HD denotes a D-
dimensional Hilbert space, H⊗ND = HD ⊗ · · · ⊗ HD denotes its N -fold tensor product, and
L(V) denotes the space of linear operators on a linear space V. The set of density operators
for a D-dimensional quantum system is a convex subset of L(HD).
The action of a device on N nominal inputs systems is then described by a trace-
preserving completely positive map
Φ(N) : L(H⊗ND ) −→ L(H⊗ND ) , (8.1)
which maps the state of the N input systems to the state of the N output systems. We
will say, in analogy to the definition of exchangeability for quantum states, that a quantum
operation Φ(N) is exchangeable if it is a member of an exchangeable sequence of quantum
operations.
To define exchangeability for a sequence of quantum operations in a natural way, we
reduce the properties of symmetry and extendibility for sequences of operations to the cor-
responding properties for sequences of states. In the following, we will use bold letters to
denote vectors of indices, e.g. j = (j1, . . . , jN). We will use π to denote a permutation of
the set {1, . . . , N}, where the cardinality N will depend on the context. The action of the
permutation π on the vector j is defined by πj = (jpi(1), . . . , jpi(N)).
Any N -system density operator ρ(N) can be expanded in the form
ρ(N) =
∑
j,l
r
(N)
j,l
N⊗
i=1
|jQii 〉〈lQii | ≡
∑
j,l
r
(N)
j,l |jQ11 〉〈lQ11 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |jQNN 〉〈lQNN | , (8.2)
where {|1Qi〉, . . . , |DQi〉} denotes an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert space HD of the ith
system, and r
(N)
j,l are the matrix elements of ρ
(N) in the tensor product basis. We define the
action of the permutation π on the state ρ(N) by
πρ(N) =
∑
j,l
r
(N)
pij,pil
N⊗
i=1
|jQii 〉〈lQii | =
∑
j,l
r
(N)
j,l
N⊗
i=1
|jQipi−1(i)〉〈lQipi−1(i)| . (8.3)
With this notation, we can make the following definition. A sequence of quantum oper-
ations, Φ(k) : L(H⊗kD )→ L(H⊗kD ), is called exchangeable if, for k = 1, 2, . . .,
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1. Φ(k) is symmetric, i.e.,
Φ(k)(ρ(k)) = π
(
Φ(k)(π−1ρ(k))
)
(8.4)
for any permutation π of the set {1, . . . , k} and for any density operator ρ(k) ∈ L(H⊗kD ),
and
2. Φ(k) is extendible, i.e.,
Φ(k)(trk+1ρ
(k+1)) = trk+1
(
Φ(k+1)(ρ(k+1))
)
(8.5)
for any state ρ(k+1).
In words, these conditions amount to the following. Condition (1) is equivalent to the
requirement that the quantum operation Φ(k) commutes with any permutation operator π
acting on the states ρ(k): It does not matter what order we send our systems through the
device; as long as we rearrange them at the end into the original order, the resulting evolution
will be the same. Condition (2) says that it does not matter if we consider a larger map
Φ(N+1) acting on a larger collection of systems (possibly entangled), or a smaller Φ(N) on
some subset of those systems: The upshot of the evolution will be the same for the relevant
systems.
We are now in a position to formulate the de Finetti representation theorem for quan-
tum operations. A quantum operation Φ(N) : L(H⊗ND ) → L(H⊗ND ) is an element of an
exchangeable sequence if and only if it can be written in the form
Φ(N) =
∫
p(Φ)Φ⊗N dΦ for all N, (8.6)
where the integral ranges over all single-shot quantum operations Φ : L(HD)→ L(HD), dΦ is
a suitable measure on the space of quantum operations, and the probability density p(Φ) ≥ 0
is unique. The tensor product Φ⊗N is defined by Φ⊗N(ρ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρN) = Φ(ρ1)⊗ · · · ⊗Φ(ρN )
for all ρ1, . . . , ρN and by linear extension for arbitrary arguments.
Just as with the original quantum de Finetti theorem [42,1], this result allows a certain
latitude in how quantum process tomography can be described. One is free to use the
language of an unknown quantum operation if the condition of exchangeability is met by
one’s prior Φ(N) but it is not required: For the quantum Bayesian in particular, the known
quantum operation Φ(N) is the only meaningful quantum operation in the problem.
IX. PROOF OF THE PROCESS-TOMOGRAPHY THEOREM
Let Φ(N), N = 1, 2, . . ., be an exchangeable sequence of quantum operations. Φ(N) can
be characterized in terms of its action on the elements of a basis of L(H⊗ND ) as follows.
Φ(N)
( N⊗
i=1
|jQii 〉〈kQii |
)
=
∑
l,m
S
(N)
l,j,m,k
N⊗
i=1
|lQii 〉〈mQii | . (9.1)
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The coefficients S
(N)
l,j,m,k specify Φ
(N) uniquely. It follows from a construction due to Choi [89]
that the S
(N)
l,j,m,k can be regarded as the matrix elements of a density operator on D
2N -
dimensional Hilbert space H⊗ND2 . This can be seen as follows. Let
|Ψ〉 = 1√
D
D∑
k=1
|kRi〉|kQi〉 ∈ HD ⊗HD = HD2 (9.2)
be a maximally entangled state in HD2 , where the |kRi〉 (k = 1, . . . , D) form orthonor-
mal bases for the ancillary systems labelled Ri (i = 1, . . . , N). The corresponding density
operator is
|Ψ〉〈Ψ| = 1
D
∑
j,k
|jRi〉〈kRi| ⊗ |jQi〉〈kQi| ∈ L(HD2) . (9.3)
Similarly, we define a map, J , from the set of quantum operations on H⊗ND to the set of
density operators on H⊗ND2 by
J(Φ(N)) ≡
(
I(N) ⊗ Φ(N)
)(
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)⊗N
)
=
1
DN
(
I(N) ⊗ Φ(N)
)(∑
j,k
N⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |jQii 〉〈kQii |)
)
=
1
DN
∑
l,j,m,k
S
(N)
l,j,m,k
N⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |lQii 〉〈mQii |) . (9.4)
In this definition, I(N) denotes the identity operation acting on the ancillary systems
R1, . . . , RN . The map J is injective, i.e. J(Φ
(N)
1 ) = J(Φ
(N)
2 ) if and only if Φ
(N)
1 = Φ
(N)
2 .
The first stage of the proof of the de Finetti theorem for operations is to show that the
density operators J(Φ(N)), N = 1, 2, . . ., form an exchangeable sequence when regarded as
N -system states, with Ri and Qi jointly forming the ith system. To do this, we first show
that J(Φ(N)) is symmetric, i.e., invariant under an arbitrary permutation π of the N systems.
Note that since the density operators ρ(N) actually span the whole vector space L(H⊗ND ),
enforcing Definition 1 above amounts to identifying the linear maps on the left- and right-
hand sides of Eqs. (8.4) and (8.5). I.e.,
Φ(k) = π ◦ Φ(k) ◦ π−1 (9.5)
and
Φ(k) ◦ trk+1 = trk+1 ◦ Φ(k+1) (9.6)
Thus in much that we do it suffices to consider the action of these maps on an arbitrary
basis state E(N) =
⊗N
i=1 |jQii 〉〈kQii | for arbitrary j and k. In particular,
π
(
Φ(N)(π−1E(N))
)
= π
(
Φ(N)
( N⊗
i=1
|jQipi(i)〉〈kQipi(i)|
))
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= π
∑
l,m
S
(N)
l,pij,m,pik
N⊗
i=1
|lQii 〉〈mQii |
=
∑
l,m
S
(N)
pil,pij,pim,pik
N⊗
i=1
|lQii 〉〈mQii | . (9.7)
Assuming Eq. (8.4), i.e., symmetry of Φ(N), for all j and k, it follows that
S
(N)
pil,pij,pim,pik = S
(N)
l,j,m,k (9.8)
for all l, j,m,k, which, using Eq. (9.4), implies that
π(J(Φ(N))) = J(Φ(N)) , (9.9)
i.e., symmetry of J(Φ(N)).
To prove extendibility of J(Φ(N)), we introduce the following notation for partial traces:
we denote by trRN+1 the partial trace over the subsystem RN+1, and by tr
Q
N+1 the partial trace
over the subsystem QN+1. In this notation, we need to show that tr
R
N+1tr
Q
N+1J(Φ
(N+1)) =
J(Φ(N)). Using Eqs. (8.5) and (9.4),
trRN+1tr
Q
N+1J(Φ
(N+1))
= trRN+1tr
Q
N+1
1
DN+1
(
I(N+1) ⊗ Φ(N+1)
)( ∑
j,jN+1,k,kN+1
N+1⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |jQii 〉〈kQii |)
)
= trQN+1
1
DN+1
(
I(N) ⊗ Φ(N+1)
)( ∑
j,k,kN+1
N⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |jQii 〉〈kQii |)⊗ |kQN+1N+1 〉〈kQN+1N+1 |
)
=
1
DN+1
∑
j,k,kN+1
( N⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii |
)
⊗ trQN+1Φ(N+1)
( N⊗
l=1
|jQil 〉〈kQil | ⊗ |kQN+1N+1 〉〈kQN+1N+1 |
)
=
1
DN+1
∑
j,k,kN+1
( N⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii |
)
⊗ Φ(N)
( N⊗
l=1
|jQil 〉〈kQil |
)
=
1
DN+1
(
I(N) ⊗ Φ(N)
)( ∑
j,k,kN+1
N⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |jQii 〉〈kQii |)
)
=
1
DN
(
I(N) ⊗ Φ(N)
)(∑
j,k
N⊗
i=1
(|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |jQii 〉〈kQii |)
)
= J(Φ(N)) . (9.10)
We have thus shown that J(Φ(N)), N = 1, 2, . . ., form an exchangeable sequence. Ac-
cording to the quantum de Finetti theorem for density operators, we can write
J(Φ(N)) =
∫
p(ρ) ρ⊗N dρ , (9.11)
where p(ρ) ≥ 0 is unique, and ∫ dρ p(ρ) = 1. With the parameterization
ρ =
1
D
∑
l,j,m,k
S
(1)
l,j,m,k|jR〉〈kR| ⊗ |lQ〉〈mQ| , (9.12)
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Eq. (9.11) takes the form
J(Φ(N)) =
1
DN
∫
D
dS p(S)
( ∑
l,j,m,k
S
(1)
l,j,m,k|jR〉〈kR| ⊗ |lQ〉〈mQ|
)⊗N
=
1
DN
∫
D
dS p(S)
N⊗
i=1
∑
li,ji,mi,ki
S
(1)
li,ji,mi,ki
|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |lQii 〉〈mQii |
=
1
DN
∑
l,j,m,k
∫
D
dS p(S)
N⊗
i=1
S
(1)
li,ji,mi,ki
|jRii 〉〈kRii | ⊗ |lQii 〉〈mQii | , (9.13)
where the integration variable is a vector with D4 components, S = (S
(1)
1,1,1,1, . . . , S
(1)
D,D,D,D),
and where the integration domain, D, is the set of all S that represent matrix elements of
a density operator. The function p(S) is unique, p(S) ≥ 0, and
∫
D
dS p(S) = 1. Notice the
slight abuse of notation in the first line of Eq. (9.13), where the superscripts R and Q label
the entire sequences of systems R1, . . . , RN and Q1, . . . , QN , respectively.
Comparing Eq. (9.13) with Eq. (9.4), we can express the coefficients S
(N)
l,j,m,k specifying
the quantum operation Φ(N) [see Eq. (9.1)] in terms of the integral above:
S
(N)
l,j,m,k =
∫
D
dS p(S)
N∏
i=1
S
(1)
li,ji,mi,ki
. (9.14)
Hence, for any j and k,
Φ(N)
( N⊗
i=1
|jQii 〉〈kQii |
)
=
∑
l,m
∫
D
dS p(S)
( N∏
i=1
S
(1)
li,ji,mi,ki
) N⊗
i=1
|lQii 〉〈mQii |
=
∫
D
dS p(S)
N⊗
i=1
∑
li,mi
S
(1)
li,ji,mi,ki
|lQii 〉〈mQii | . (9.15)
The D4 coefficients, S
(1)
l,j,m,k, of the vector S define a single-system map, ΦS, via
ΦS(|jQ〉〈kQ|) ≡
∑
l,m
S
(1)
l,j,m,k|lQ〉〈mQ| (j, k = 1, . . . , D) . (9.16)
Hence
Φ(N)
( N⊗
i=1
|jQii 〉〈kQii |
)
=
∫
D
dS p(S)
N⊗
i=1
ΦS
(
|jQii 〉〈kQii |
)
=
∫
D
dS p(S) Φ⊗NS
( N⊗
i=1
|jQii 〉〈kQii |
)
. (9.17)
Since this equality holds for arbitrary j and k, it implies the representation
Φ(N) =
∫
D
dS p(S) Φ⊗NS . (9.18)
For all S ∈ D, the map ΦS is completely positive. This can be seen by considering
J(ΦS) = (I ⊗ ΦS)(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = 1
D
∑
l,j,m,k
S
(1)
l,j,m,k|jR〉〈kR| ⊗ |lQ〉〈mQ| ,
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which, by definition of D, is a density operator and therefore positive. It follows from a
theorem by Choi [89] that ΦS is completely positive.
To complete the proof, we will now show that p(S) = 0 almost everywhere unless ΦS is
trace-preserving, i.e., a quantum operation. More precisely, we show that if U ∈ D is such
that ΦU is not trace-preserving, then there exists an open ball B containing U such that
p(S) = 0 in B ∩ D.
The essence of the argument can be most easily explained in the special case that the
integral (7.1) takes the form of a sum,
Φ(N) =
∑
i
pi Φ
⊗N
i , (9.19)
where pi > 0. It follows that
1 =
∑
i
pi(tr[Φi(ρ)])
N (9.20)
for all single-system density operators ρ. Now assume that the sum extends over some non-
trace-preserving operation, which we take to be Φ1 without loss of generality. This means
that
tr[Φ1(ρ)] 6= 1 (9.21)
for some single-system density operator ρ. Now either tr[Φ1(ρ)] < 1, in which case normal-
ization of Φ(1)(ρ) implies that tr[Φk(ρ)] > 1 for some k 6= 1, or tr[Φ1(ρ)] > 1, in which case
we set k = 1. In both cases
pk(tr[Φk(ρ)])
N →∞ , (9.22)
which contradicts Eq. (9.20). We have thus shown that the sum (9.19) extends only over
trace-preserving operations.
Now let us return to the general case where Φ(N) is represented by an integral. For δ > 0
and U ∈ D, we define Bδ(U) to be the set of all S such that |S − U | < δ, i.e., Bδ(U) is the
open ball of radius δ centered at U . Furthermore, we define B¯δ(U) = Bδ(U) ∩ D.
Let U ∈ D be such that ΦU is not trace-preserving, i.e., there exists a density operator
ρ for which tr[ΦU(ρ)] 6= 1. We distinguish two cases.
Case (i): tr[ΦU(ρ)] = 1+ǫ, where ǫ > 0. Since tr[ΦS(ρ)] is a linear and therefore continuous
function of the vector S, there exists δ > 0 such that∣∣∣tr[ΦS(ρ)]− tr[ΦU(ρ)]∣∣∣ < ǫ/2 (9.23)
whenever S ∈ Bδ(U). For S ∈ B¯δ(U),
tr[ΦS(ρ)] > 1 + ǫ− ǫ/2 = 1 + ǫ/2 . (9.24)
Therefore
tr[Φ(N)(ρ⊗N)] = tr
[∫
D
dS p(S) Φ⊗NS (ρ
⊗N)
]
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=
∫
D
dS p(S) (tr[ΦS(ρ)])
N
=
∫
D\B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) (tr[ΦS(ρ)])
N +
∫
B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) (tr[ΦS(ρ)])
N
≥
∫
B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) (tr[ΦS(ρ)])
N
> (1 + ǫ/2)N
∫
B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) . (9.25)
Unless
∫
B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) = 0, there exists N such that tr[Φ(N)(ρ⊗N )] > 1, which contradicts the
assumption that Φ(N) is trace-preserving. Hence p(S) = 0 almost everywhere in B¯δ(U).
Case (ii): tr[ΦU(ρ)] = 1 − ǫ, where 0 < ǫ ≤ 1. Because of continuity, there exists δ > 0
such that ∣∣∣tr[ΦS(ρ)]− tr[ΦU(ρ)]∣∣∣ < ǫ/2 (9.26)
whenever S ∈ Bδ(U). Hence, for S ∈ B¯δ(U),
tr[ΦS(ρ)] < 1− ǫ+ ǫ/2 = 1− ǫ/2 . (9.27)
Now assume that
∫
B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) = η > 0. Then, letting N = 1,
1 = tr[Φ(1)(ρ)] = tr
[∫
D
dS p(S) ΦS(ρ)
]
=
∫
D\B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) tr[ΦS(ρ)] +
∫
B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) tr[ΦS(ρ)]
<
∫
D\B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) tr[ΦS(ρ)] + η(1− ǫ/2) , (9.28)
which implies that∫
D\B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) tr[ΦS(ρ)] > 1− η + ηǫ/2 > 1− η . (9.29)
Since ∫
D\B¯δ(U)
dS p(S) = 1− η , (9.30)
it follows that there exist ζ > 0 and a point V ∈ D\B¯δ(U) such that tr[ΦV (ρ)] > 1 and∫
B¯ξ(V )
dS p(S) > 0 for all ξ ≤ ζ . (9.31)
We are thus back to case (i) above. Repeating the argument of case (i) one can show that
this contradicts the assumption that Φ(N) is trace preserving for large N . It follows that
η = 0, i.e., p(S) = 0 almost everywhere in B¯δ(U). This concludes the proof of the de Finetti
theorem for quantum operations.
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What we have proven here is a representation theorem. It shows us when an experimenter
is warranted to think of his (prior) known quantum operation assignment as built out of a
lack of knowledge of a “true” but unknown one. In that way, the theorem has the same kind
of attraction as the previous de Finetti theorem for quantum states.
In particular for a Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics, it may be a necessary
ingredient for its very consistency. In Refs. [4,6], it has been argued strenuously that quantum
operations should be considered of essentially the same physical meaning and status as
quantum states themselves: They are Bayesian expressions of an experimenter’s judgment.
This could be captured in the slogan “a quantum operation is really a quantum state in
disguise.” In other words, the Choi representation theorem [89] is not just a mathematical
nicety, but is instead of deep physical significance. 10
Therefore, just as an unknown quantum state is an oxymoron in a Bayesian interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, so should be an unknown quantum operation. In the case of
quantum states, the conundrum is solved by the existence of a de Finetti theorem for quan-
tum tomography. In this section we have shown that the conundrum in quantum process
tomography can be solved in the same way.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Is there something in nature even when there are no observers or agents about? At
the practical level, it would seem hard to deny this, and neither of the authors wish to be
viewed as doing so. The world persists without the observer—there is no doubt in either
of our minds about that. But then, does that require that two of the most celebrated
elements (namely, quantum states and operations) in quantum theory—our best, most all-
encompassing scientific theory to date—must be viewed as objective, agent-independent
constructs? There is no reason to do so, we say. In fact, we think there is everything to be
gained from carefully delineating which part of the structure of quantum theory is about the
world and which part is about the agent’s interface with the world.
From this perspective, much—but not all—of quantum mechanics is about disciplined
uncertainty accounting, just as is Bayesian probability theory in general. Bernardo and
Smith [11] write this of Bayesian theory,
What is the nature and scope of Bayesian Statistics ... ?
Bayesian Statistics offers a rationalist theory of personalistic beliefs in con-
texts of uncertainty, with the central aim of characterising how an individual
should act in order to avoid certain kinds of undesirable behavioural inconsis-
tencies. The theory establishes that expected utility maximization provides the
basis for rational decision making and that Bayes’ theorem provides the key to the
ways in which beliefs should fit together in the light of changing evidence. The
goal, in effect, is to establish rules and procedures for individuals concerned with
10There have been a few pieces of recent technical work that may be useful for shoring up this
idea. On the contingency, see Ref. [90].
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disciplined uncertainty accounting. The theory is not descriptive, in the sense
of claiming to model actual behaviour. Rather, it is prescriptive, in the sense of
saying “if you wish to avoid the possibility of these undesirable consequences you
must act in the following way.
In fact, one might go further and say of quantum theory, that in those cases where it is not
just Bayesian probability theory full stop, it is a theory of stimulation and response [4,22].
The agent, through the process of quantum measurement stimulates the world external
to himself. The world, in return, stimulates a response in the agent that is quantified by a
change in his beliefs—i.e., by a change from a prior to a posterior quantum state. Somewhere
in the structure of those belief changes lies quantum theory’s most direct statement about
what we believe of the world as it is without agents.
The present effort, showing how a Bayesian account of quantum states and operations is
fully consistent with the laboratory practices of quantum-state and process tomography, is
a necessary exercise along the way to pinpointing that direct statement.
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